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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LYLE C. HENDRICKS, : 
Petitioner-Appellant, : 
v. : 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Respondent-Appellee. 
: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the district court's dismissal of 
a petition for writ of habeas corpus involving a first degree 
felony. Appellee has filed a motion to transfer this appeal to the 
Utah Supreme Court, based upon rule 44 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(g) (Supp. 
1992). Section 78-2a-3(2)(g) explicitly excludes from this Court's 
jurisdiction, appeals from petitions challenging convictions of 
first degree felonies. Jurisdiction properly lies with the Utah 
Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i), as this is 
an appeal "from the district court involving a conviction of a 
first degree or capital felony." 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
This case involves the summary dismissal of a petition 
for writ of habeas corpus. The issue raised on appeal is: 
1 
Case No. 930055-CA 
Priority No. 3 
Did the district court properly dismiss the petition as 
frivolous? In reviewing a dismissal of a habeas corpus petition, 
the appellate court examines the record "in the light most 
favorable to the findings and judgment . . . and will not reverse 
if there is a reasonable basis in the record to support the trial 
court's denial of the writ." Hall v. Utah Board of Pardons, 806 
P.2d 217 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted). See also Waastaff 
v. Barnes, 802 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah App. 1990); Medina v. Cook, 779 
P.2d 658 (Utah 1989); Bundv v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 
1988). 
However, no deference is accorded the lower court's 
conclusions of law underlying the dismissal of the petition. 
Rather, the appellate court reviews such determinations for 
correctness. Gerrish v. Barnes, 844 P.2d 315, 318-19 (Utah 1992) 
(citing Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes 
or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issue presented is 
contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
Petitioner was convicted of aggravated robbery, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1987) 
*Appellee relies on many documents that are not part of the 
record on appeal, but were considered by the district court in 
dismissing the petition. Therefore, appellee has filed a motion to 
supplement the record, which is currently before this Court. 
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(Addendum A). On February 22, 1988, petitioner was sentenced to a 
term of five years to life, along with a one year firearm 
enhancement (JEd.. ). Petitioner timely appealed his conviction 
(Addendum B). On appeal, petitioner claimed that: (1) his 
admissions to police while in custody were improperly admitted at 
trial; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; 
(3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (4) he was 
subjected to prosecutorial misconduct (Addendum C). The Utah Court 
of Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction in a memorandum 
decision dated February 5, 1990 (Id.). 
On November 20, 1989, petitioner filed a motion for new 
trial in the Second Judicial District Court (Addendum D). In his 
motion, petitioner claimed that newly discovered evidence 
demonstrated his right to a new trial (.Id. ). Specifically, 
petitioner argued that his attorney, Stephen Laker, perjured 
himself when he told the trial court that he had spoken to attorney 
Scott Jensen concerning petitioner's case (Xd. at 4). Petitioner 
further claimed that Scott Jensen's testimony would have 
contradicted that of Detective Miner (JId.). The district court 
denied petitioner's motion for new trial on December 12, 1989, 
finding that, even after a review of Scott Jensen's affidavit, 
there was no substantial evidence to support petitioner's claims 
(Addendum E). 
On or about October 29, 1990, petitioner filed a "Motion 
for an Order of Dismissal of Information" in the Second Judicial 
District Court (Addendum F). At a minimum, petitioner claimed 
3 
that: (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction "of the subject-
matter of aggravated robbery"; (2) Detective Miner perjured 
himself; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his 
conviction (Id.. at 5, 6, 9). The district court denied 
petitioner's motion to dismiss on December 26, 1990 as being wholly 
without merit (Addendum G). 
On April 27, 1992, petitioner filed a "petition for writ 
of error coram nobis in trial court" in the Second Judicial 
District Court (Addendum H) • Petitioner claimed that: (1) his 
trial counsel, Stephen Laker, failed to contact petitioner's 
previous attorney, Scott Jensen, regarding Detective Miner's 
testimony; (2) Detective Miner lied under oath regarding a jailroom 
conversation; and (3) Scott Jensen's affidavit constituted "newly 
discovered evidence" supporting petitioner's claims (.Id..). On May 
15/ 1992, the district court dismissed the petition as frivolous, 
on the ground that it was repetitious of motions previously made 
and denied (Addendum I). 
On December 1, 1992, petitioner filed a "writ of 
extraordinary relief", hereinafter referred to as "petition", in 
the Second Judicial District Court (R. 1-4; Addendum J). 
Petitioner alleged that: (1) Detective Miner perjured himself; (2) 
his counsel, Stephen Laker, was ineffective for failing to 
challenge the perjured testimony; (3) the evidence was insufficient 
to support his conviction; and (4) the affidavit of Scott Jensen 
constituted "newly discovered evidence" (Id.). On January 13, 
1993, the district court dismissed the petition as frivolous on the 
4 
ground that it was "repetitious of motions previously made and 
denied" (R. 13; Addendum K). Petitioner filed a notice of appeal 
in the district court on January 25, 1993 (R. 15; Addendum L). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A statement of facts beyond those set forth in the above 
Statement of the Case is not necessary to resolve the issue 
presented on appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court properly dismissed as frivolous the 
December 1992 petition for writ of habeas corpus; the court 
reviewed the file from petitioner's criminal proceedings and 
correctly determined that petitioner's allegations were repetitious 
of motions previously denied. Petitioner's claims either were 
raised and litigated on appeal, or should have been raised on 
appeal. Furthermore, petitioner's claims are time-barred by the 
statute of limitations. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE 
PETITION AS FRIVOLOUS: PETITIONER'S 
CLAIMS EITHER WERE RAISED AND DECIDED OR 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED ON APPEAL. 
In Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989), the Utah 
Supreme Court set out the standard of review for claims previously 
adjudicated on appeal. Specifically, the Court stated that 
A ground for relief from a conviction or 
sentence that has once been fully and fairly 
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adjudicated on appeal or in a prior habeas 
proceeding should not be readjudicated unless 
it can be shown that there are "unusual 
circumstances." For example, a prior 
adjudication is not a bar to reexamination of 
a conviction if there has been a retroactive 
change in the law, a subsequent discovery of 
suppressed evidence, or newly discovered 
evidence. 
Lairbv v. Barnes, 793 P.2d 377 (Utah 1990) (quoting Hurst, 777 P.2d 
at 1036). Petitioner's claims that: (1) Detective Miner perjured 
himself; (2) his counsel, Stephen Laker, was ineffective for 
failing to challenge the perjured testimony; and (3) the evidence 
was insufficient to support his conviction, were all raised and 
adjudicated on petitioner's direct appeal (Addendum C). Petitioner 
claims he did not raise these claims on his appeal because he did 
not have the affidavit of Scott Jensen, which he characterizes as 
"newly discovered evidence" (R. 2; Addendum J). However, 
petitioner's claim is unfounded. Petitioner procured Mr. Jensen's 
affidavit, which is dated December 6, 1988, several years ago, and 
attached it to his motion for new trial (Addendum D). Furthermore, 
review of the appellate court's memorandum decision reveals that 
petitioner submitted Mr. Jensen's affidavit to the court on his 
direct appeal (Utah Court of Appeals memorandum decision dated 
February 5, 1990, attached as Addendum C). Specifically, the court 
of appeals stated, 
[ajppellant's claim that attorney Jensen's 
testimony at trial would support appellant's 
argument that Miner lied about the confessions 
is unsupported by the record. Jensen's 
affidavit acknowledges that he may have been 
present at the prearraignment meeting with 
Miner but has no recollection of the meeting 
or any discussions. We find no error in 
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defense counsel not calling Jensen as a 
witness at trial. 
Id. at 4. Since Mr. Jensen's affidavit is not newly discovered 
evidence, there are no unusual circumstances warranting 
reexamination of petitioner's claims. 
Even if the exact claims contained in the petition were 
not raised on appeal, petitioner is barred from now obtaining 
habeas corpus relief. A writ of habeas corpus is not a substitute 
for direct appeal and cannot be used to fulfill the purpose of 
regular appellate review. Codianna v. Morris, 660 P. 2d 1101 (Utah 
1983). See also Wacrstaff v. Barnes, 802 P.2d 774 (Utah App. 1990); 
Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989). The Utah Supreme Court 
has stated: 
It is therefore well settled in this state 
that allegations of error that could have been 
but were not raised on appeal from a criminal 
conviction cannot be raised by habeas corpus 
or postconviction review, except in unusual 
circumstances. 
Codianna, 660 P. 2d at 1104. The Court further noted that habeas 
corpus may be invoked 
only when the court had no jurisdiction over 
the person or the offense, or where the 
requirements of law have been so disregarded 
that the party is substantially and 
effectively denied due process of law, or 
where some such fact is shown that it would be 
unconscionable not to re-examine the 
conviction. 
Id. at 1105 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). If the alleged 
error is known or should have been known to the petitioner at the 
time judgment was entered, 
7 
it must be reviewed in the manner and within 
the time permitted by regular prescribed 
procedure, or the judgment becomes final and 
is not subject to further attack, except in 
some such unusual circumstance as we have 
mentioned above. Were it otherwise, the 
regular rules of procedure governing appeals 
and the limitations of time specified therein 
would be rendered impotent. 
Id. (citations omitted). Accord Gerrish v. Barnes. 844 P.2d 315 
319 (Utah 1992). 
Petitioner's claims should have been known to petitioner 
by the time he was sentenced. Therefore, petitioner should have 
raised these claims on direct appeal. Petitioner claims that he 
did not raise the issues on direct appeal because he did not have 
Scott Jensen's affidavit, which petitioner characterizes as "newly 
discovered evidence", enabling him to bypass the requirement of 
bringing all claims on appeal (R. 2). However, the foregoing 
demonstrates that Mr. Jensen's affidavit is not "newly discovered 
evidence". Therefore, petitioner has not demonstrated unusual 
circumstances warranting his failure to raise all claims on direct 
appeal. Since petitioner's claims are not proper for habeas corpus 
or post-conviction relief, the district court properly dismissed 
the petition as frivolous. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED 
THE PETITION AS FRIVOLOUS: PETITIONER'S 
CLAIMS WERE REPETITIOUS OF PREVIOUS 
MOTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN DENIED. 
The district court's dismissal of the petition as 
frivolous was based upon the finding that the petition "is 
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repetitious of motions previously made and denied" (R. 13; Addendum 
K). A review of petitioner's file from his criminal proceedings 
clearly supports the district court's conclusion. The claims 
contained in the petition were previously raised by petitioner in 
his: (1) motion for new trial; (2) motion for an order of 
dismissal of information; and (3) petition for writ of error coram 
nobis in trial court (Addenda D, F, and H). Petitioner merely 
reasserted claims previously raised and denied in order to get one 
more bite at the apple. As already noted, claims which have been 
previously litigated should not be reasserted in a petition for 
habeas corpus or post-conviction relief, absent unusual 
circumstances. See Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1036. Therefore, the 
district court properly dismissed the petition as frivolous. Since 
petitioner has failed to demonstrate the impropriety of the 
district court's ruling, this Court should affirm the dismissal of 
the petition. 
POINT III 
PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ARE TIME-BARRED BY 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS CONTAINED IN 
UTAH CODE ANN. S 78-12-31.1. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1, which governs habeas corpus 
and post-conviction relief/ provides that such actions must be 
filed: 
Within three months: 
For relief pursuant to a writ of habeas 
corpus. This limitation shall apply not only 
as to grounds known to petitioner but also to 
grounds which in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have been known by petitioner 
or counsel for petitioner. 
9 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992). Since all of petitioner's 
allegations relate to matters which occurred at trial, petitioner 
should have raised his claims by May 22, 1988, three months after 
he was sentenced. However, the petition was not filed until 
December 1, 1992, over four years beyond the statutory period. All 
of petitioner's allegations are based on grounds which were known 
or should have been known by petitioner through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence. For this reason, petitioner's claims are 
time-barred. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the 
district court's dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus relief 
as frivolous. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this M V day of July, 1993. 
1 JLc*A % 'UuVl^ 
ANGELA*. MICKLOS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Defendant having been convicted by Bel a jury; C 1 the court; []plea of guilty; 
[]plea of no ..contest; of the.offense ofj\r.r. pnpprw , a 
felony of the 1st degree, being now present in court and ready for sentence, 
is now adjudicated guilty of the above offense and is now sentenced as follows: 
THE BASIC SENTENCE 
[ ] not to exceed five (5) years at the Utah State Prison; 
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{% not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison; 
[ ] to pay fine in the amount of $ . 
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Defendant is additionally sentenced as follows: 
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said sentence to run consecutive to the basic sentence as set forth above. 
HABITUAL CRIMINAL ALTERNATIVE PUNISHMENT 
Upon a finding that the defendant Is in the status of an habitual criminal, the 
defendant is sentenced to: 
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RESTITUTION 
[ ] Defendant is ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ , tc 
. • 
Defendant is remanded into custody of: 
[ ] the Sheriff of this county, for delivery to the Warden or other appropriate 
official at the Utah State Prison for execution of sentence; or 
fc] the Warden for execution of this sentence. 
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A D D E N D U M C 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
- ooOoo 
State of Utah, ) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ) (Not For Publication) 
v. ) Case No. 890255-CA 
Lyle C. Hendricks, ) F I L E D 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
Before Judges Garff, Billings and Davidson. 
PER CURIAM: 
Appellant Lyle Hendricks appeals his conviction of 
aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-302 (1989). Following appellant's conviction, his 
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court was transferred to this court 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1989). In presenting his 
appeal, Appellant was permitted to supplement the brief filed 
by his attorney and submit his own pro jg£ arguments. We have 
considered all of the issues presented in appellant's brief and 
in his pro £& supplemental brief. We affirm the conviction. 
We need only briefly explain appellant's crime. On the 
afternoon of December 8, 1987, appellant entered Murray's 
Pharmacy and walked behind the pharmacy counter. He pointed a 
gun at the pharmacist and demanded all of his class II 
narcotics. When the pharmacist was able to convince appellant 
that he had no class II drugs, appellant turned and walked 
away, muttering that he was "just fooling, anyway." Appellant 
and his accomplice drove off in appellant's blue suzuki 
samari. The police were notified and pursued the saroari. In 
the pursuit, appellant and the accomplice jumped from the 
vehicle and ran. Both were later caught and arrested. 
On appeal, appellant argues that his admissions to 
police while in custody were inadmissible at trial, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, appellant 
was denied the effective assistance of counsel and the 
prosecutor committed misconduct^ Appellant's supplemental 
brief does not add any substantial additional issue requiring 
our discussion but merely reargues these contentions. 
FEB 51990 
MaryT Noontn 
Clerk of t * Court 
Utah Court * Appeals 
We observe that in pretrial lineups and at trial the 
pharmacist and his assistant unequivocally identified appellant 
as the robber and gave clear descriptions of the aggravated 
robbery incident. Police officers testified regarding 
appellant's capture and arrest and the subsequent inculpatory 
statements he made after he was advised of his rights. 
Appellant did not testify at trial and did not present any 
evidence in his defense. Yet on appeal, appellant attempts to 
bolster his pro ££ arguments by asserting facts not in the 
record and by relying upon his own version of the events to 
excuse his conduct. Appellant draws conclusions and asserts 
motives which are not supported by any evidence at trial. 
First, appellant claims that his admissions to detective 
Miner at the time of arraignment, the day after appellant's 
arrest, were inadmissible because appellant was not readvised 
of his Miranda rights. It is undisputed that, at the time of 
the arrest, appellant was advised of his rights by Detective 
Miner. Appellant said he knew his rights. After the arrest, 
he was advised of his rights again prior to a lineup 
proceeding, expressly waived them, and initiated conversations 
with police detectives. Appellant' proffered an alibi that his 
friend had taken his samari, but that he, appellant, had not 
been near the pharmacy. When his story was questioned, 
appellant admitted that he had gone to the pharmacy to get some 
cold medicine. 
The next morning, while awaiting a video arraignment at 
the jail, appellant asked to speak with Detective Miner. 
Appellant told Miner that his own attorney had withdrawn from 
representation. A legal defender attorney, Mr. Jensen, was 
present to assist with other criminal arraignments and to 
assist appellant in his arraignment. Jensen listened while 
appellant talked to Miner. During his conversation with Miner, 
appellant confessed to the crime and admitted his guilt. 
Detective Miner testified at trial regarding the 
admissions by appellant in this conversation. Although 
appellant did not offer any rebuttal evidence at trial, he now 
tries to claim that his confession was coerced and he was 
improperly interrogated without the presence of his own 
attorney. He relies upon the detective's failure to read him 
his Miranda rights a third time before talking to him. 
A Miranda warning is not required before each and every 
conversation with an accused. Cf. Edwards v. Arizona. 451 U.S. 
477, 483-5 (1981). Appellant knew and understood his rights to 
counsel and to remain silent. He knowingly and voluntarily 
relinquished them. The evidence is clear that appellant 
himself initiated his conversation with Detective Miner. 
Furthermore, his admissions were knowing and voluntary. There 
was no evidence that the police exerted any improper influence 
or inducement, made any threat of harm or abuse, or offered any 
improper promise. And, an attorney from the legal defender's 
office (who also represented defendant at trial) was present 
when defendant sought out Miner in conversation. Appellant's 
admissions were properly admitted into evidence. £&£ State v. 
Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 466-7 (Utah 1988); State v. Moore, 697 
P.2d 233, 235-6 (Utah 1985); fififi fll££ Oregon v. Bradshaw. 462 
U.S. 1043 (1983). 
Appellant also argues that the evidence is insufficient 
to support the first degree felony of aggravated robbery 
because defendant was "just fooling" and lacked the necessary 
intent. Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(3)(1989), a person 
commits aggravated robbery if he uses a dangerous weapon (e.g. 
automatic firearm) while attempting a robbery. Appellant's 
demand for controlled narcotics was enforced by intimidation 
and fear of his automatic weapon which he pointed at the 
pharmacist. Testimony of appellant's conduct and demeanor were 
unchallenged at trial. Whether appellant was serious, or was 
not serious, and had the requisite intent to commit the robbery 
was a fact for the determination of the jury. State v. Brown. 
607 P.2d 261, 267 (Utah 1980); State v. McQueen. 14 Utah 2d 
311, 383 P.2d 921 (1963). Intent is rarely susceptable to 
direct proof. To ascertain appellant's true intent, the jury 
was entitled to resort to reasonable inferences based upon an 
examination of all the surrounding circumstances. State v. 
Gutierrez. 714 P.2d 295, 296 (Utah 1986); SS& also State v. 
Rovball. 689 P.2d 1338, 1339 (Utah 1984).The evidence is not so 
lacking or insubstantial that reasonable minds must have a 
reasonable doubt of defendant's intent to commit a robbery, 
even though the robbery was not completed. We reject 
appellant's unsupported contention that the jury was "mislead" 
and -lied to." 
Appellant personally argues that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel at trial because his court 
appointed attorney failed to adequately investigate the facts, 
failed to present a defense, and had a conflict of interest. 
Appellant complains that his attorney failed to discover 
and bring out at trial that the pharmacist had been previously 
involved in illegal distribution of controlled narcotics. 
f»aftoe.*_n* 
Appellant fails to show the relevance or admissibility of such 
evidence at trial. The absence of such evidence to impeach the 
witness was, at best, harmless error in view of the unequivocal 
testimony of the other eyewitness to appellant*s crime and 
defendant's admissions. Appellant fails to show that he was 
unfairly prejudiced by the lack of this evidence. Moreover, 
there is no basis to argue that this evidence would support a 
claim that defendant was "just fooling around.9 
Appellant's claim that attorney Jensen's testimony at 
trial would support appellant's argument that Miner lied about 
the confessions is unsupported by the record. Jensen's 
affidavit acknowledges that he may have been present at the 
prearraignment meeting with Miner but has no recollection of 
the meeting or any discussions. We find no error in defense 
counsel not calling Jensen as a witness at trial. 
Appellant says he was denied a defense at trial. But he 
does not articulate what defense he "insisted" be presented by 
counsel and what facts would have supported that defense. Even 
assuming that the defense tactics of appellant's attorney taken 
at trial should not be accorded the widest latitudes, there is 
no support for the contention that 'appellant was precluded from 
asserting his innocence at trial. State v. Wood. 648 P.2d 71, 
92 (Utah 1981). 
In State v. Frame. 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court applied the principles of Strickland v. 
Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and recognized the "strong 
presumption" that counsel rendered adequate assistance and 
exercised reasonably professional judgment. 
It is not enough to claim that the alleged 
errors had some conceivable effect on the 
outcome or could have had a prejudicial 
effect on the fact finders. To be found 
sufficiently prejudicial, appellant must 
affirmative show that a "reasonable 
probability" exists that, but for counsel's 
error, the result would have been 
different. We have defined "reasonable 
probability" as that sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the reliability of the verdict. 
[These principles] . . • are guides to 
the ultimate focus upon the fundamental 
fairness of the proceeding challenged . . . . 
[W]e need not determine whether counsel's 
performance was deficient if appellant fails 
eoftoec_r»A 
to satisfy his burden of showing that he 
suffered unfair prejudice as a result of the 
alleged deficiencies. Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. 
£££ SlSP State v. Julian. 771 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1989); StStS Vt 
Verde. 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989); State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 
270 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Just as in ELSE& and Strickland, if appellant fails to show 
that he was unfairly prejudiced, we need not, and do not, agree 
with appellant's lengthy arguments that counsel9s efforts at 
trial were deficient. Strickland. 486 U.S. at 697. £umi£# 723 
P.2d at 405. Upon the record as a whole and considering the 
overwhelming evidence against appellant, we are persuaded that 
the alleged errors of his trial attorney had no reasonable 
effect on the verdict. Appellant does not show that, absent 
the alleged errors, the result would have been different with 
any reasonable probability. Our confidence in the reliability 
of the verdict and the fundamental fairness of the trial is not 
undermined. Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. 
Finally, we reject appellant's*claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct because the prosecutor referred to defendant's 
admissions in her closing argument and did not tell the jury 
that Detective Miner was "lying". Also, there was no conflict 
of interest between appellant's attorney and by Attorney 
Jensen. There is not one shred of evidence in the record or 
one fact identified by appellant that supports his claim of 
defective counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. 
We have also separately examined and reject the numerous 
other contentions by appellant. They are unsupported by the 
record and-we need not to discuss them here. Appellant's 
conviction-is affirmed. 
Kegnal W. Garff, ~Judg% 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
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AFFIDAVIT OF G. SCOTT JENSEN 
I, G. SCOTT JENSEN, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
depose and say as follows: 
1. That I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the 
State of Utah. 
2. That on December 9, 1987 I worked on a part-time basis 
with the Weber County Public Defender Association. 
3. It is possible on December 9, 1987 I stood with Mr. Lyle 
C. Hendricks for an arraignment. 
4. After discussing the matter with Martin Gravis, the 
history of the case sounded vaguely familiar and I might have been 
the one who stood up with Lyle during his arraignment. 
5. I do not remember having an conversation with Stephen 
Laker regarding Mr. Lyle Hendricks. 
6. If I was the attorney who was present with Mr. Hendricks 
during his arraignment, I have no recollection of what took place at 
the arraignment, or of any conversation with Stephen Laker. 
DATED this fn day of December, 1988. 
G. SCOTT JE: 
Attorne: 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to beforg*me this \JJ day of 
December, 1988. 
My Commission Expires: ( AlLCQ (/ Gjfe^^^ 
Residing ^^psy\jj[Xf\{}Q^
 f Ctfa/j 
BOX 250 
DRAPER, UTAH 84020 
•" ^r^^yf " 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LYLE HENDRICKS, 
Defendant. 
\ 
\ 
\ 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 871918592 
J1EC i 2 1969 
Having reviewed the memoranda and affidavits on file, I 
find and rule as follows: 
Defendant alleges that one of his attorneys, Scott 
Jensen, should have testified at his trial and that his 
testimony would contradict the testimony of Detective Shane 
Minor. None of defendant's affidavits or copies of 
correspondence from Mr. Jensen suggest that Mr. Jensen can 
recall any facts concerning this case. 
Absent substantial evidence that Mr. Jensen recalls facts 
significantly inconsistent with the testimony of Detective 
Minor# I find that there is no basis for defendant's request for 
a new trial. 
Defendant's motion is denied. 
DATED this day of December, 1989. 
BY THE CO 
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Order Denying Defendant's 
Motion for a New Trial 
Case No. 871918592 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 1^ day of December, 
1989 I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order 
Denying Defendant's Motion for a New Trial to counsel as follows: 
Kristine M. Knowlton 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
7th Floor Municipal Building 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Lyle C. Hendricks 
defendant pro se 
P. 0. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
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KSm'CT COURT 
WEBE? COUNTY 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTJt<0£Cc|SRiPftF4W^ER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs . 
LYLE C. HENDRICKS, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 871918592 
Having examined the memoranda and other documents on 
file, I find and rule as follows: 
I find the contentions of defendant to be totally without 
merit and not worthy of further comment other than to rule that 
defendant's motion is denied. 
<2£ DATED this day of December, 1990. 
, Judge 
Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
Case No. 871918592 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the Mi 
day of December, 
1990, I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss to counsel as follows: 
Lyle C. Hendricks 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 840 
Kristine M. Knowlton 
Weber County Attorneys Office 
2549 Washington Blvd, 7th Floor 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
A D D E N D U M H 
Lyle C. Hendricks 'J'.'TY 
Attorney Pro-Se 
Utah State Prison Z1/ci ?i\ 1 12 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Lyle C. Hendricks 
Petitioner 
v. 
State of Utah 
Respondent 
Petition for Writ of Error 
Coram Nobis in Trial 
Court. 
HAY o 1 1992 
Case No: 18592 
Judge: David E. Roth 
COMES NOW, Petitioner, Lyle C. Hendricks, pursuant to Rule 60 (B) and Rule 65 (B) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and for cause of action alleges as follows: 
1. A Commitment order was issued on the 22nd day of February, 1988 by 
the Honorable David E. Roth, Judge of the Second District Court in and 
for the County of Weber, State of Utah, in a criminal complaint which 
had charged petitioner with Aggravated Robbery. 
2. That petitioner was sentenced to a term of 5 to life at the Utah State 
Prison, plus 1 year enhancement for using a firearm. 
3. The judgement of conviction which resulted in the confinement 
complained of has been reviewed on appeal. Petitioner's conviction was 
appealed by his court appointed counsel and on or about February 5th 
1990, petitioner's sentence was affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
4. That petitioner is currently located at the Utah State Prison, P.O. Box 
250, Draper, Utah, 84020. 
1 
That petitioner's restraint by respondent is unlawful and unconstitutional 
in that there was a substantial denial of his rights under the constitution 
as follows: 
A. That counsel for petitioner failed to contact petitioner's previous 
counsel to investigate and question the testimony of detective 
Minor. 
B. That detective Minor assigned to the case lied under oath and 
perjured himself in court by testifying that he and the petitioner had 
a conversation in one of the jail interview rooms where detective 
Minor, petitioner and the public defender were present. Where 
detective Minor states that the public defender kept leaving the 
interview room to go to where the video arraignments were being 
held, then the public defender would return for a couple of 
minutes and leave the room again until finally he came back and 
said it was petitioners turn, that detective Minor testifies that 
during this conversation in the jail interview room, that the 
petitioner told him that he wanted some drugs, and petitioner went 
on to tell detective Minor that he had been taking cocaine that day, 
and was coming down and had, had a confrontation with an 
individual and that he planned on killing the individual. Detective 
Miner testifies that the petitioner was coming down off of the 
cocaine, and he wanted to stay high, he did not want to back out 
of it, and wanted to go through with the killing. (See Transcript 
Exhibits) 
2 
Petitioner contends that the only conversation he had with 
detective Minor was in the hallway. Where petitioner stopped 
detective Minor and asked why he was being charged with a first 
degree felony. Where in detective Minor stated, because a 
firearm was used. The public defender who was representing the 
petitioner has supplied an affidavit in which he supports the 
petitioners contentions regarding this matter. (See Affidavit of 
G. Scott Jensen) 
Through diligence, Petitioner was finally able to bring to recall, 
the facts by send attorney G. Scott Jensen, a photograph of 
petitioner and trial transcripts, where upon Attorney G. Scott 
Jensen sent petitioner an affidavit supporting his claims, which is 
now "Newly Discovered Evidence", material for the party 
making the petition, which he could not, with reasonable 
diligence, have discovered and produced at his trial". "Like wise, 
petitioner did not, nor could not, produce this evidence at the time 
of appeal. 
Petitioner recalls this perjurious testimony being brought to the 
attention of Kristine Knowlton, Deputy District Attorney and the 
Honorable David E. Roth, in this Judge's Chambers, and that the 
result of the trial would have been different, the court then 
multiplied the error made by the officer by allowing it to be 
introduced before the jury. There is no doubt that the error was 
significantly prejudicial to the ability of the defendant to gain a fair 
3 
trial. 
6. That Pursuant to URCP Rule 65 B (i) (7) and URCP Rule 65 B (i) (9), 
Petitioner request that this court, order the state to obtain such transcripts 
of proceedings or court records as may be relevant and material to this 
case and requests that the county in which petitioner was originally 
charged be directed to pay the costs of the proceedings. 
Wherefore, Petitioner prays that this Court: 
1. Schedule on evidentiary hearing at which time petitioner may be 
present and represented by counsel. 
2. Permit petitioner, who remains indigent, to proceed without pre-
payment of costs, fees or other assessments. 
3. Grant petitioner the authority to obtain subpoenas in Forma 
Pauperis, for witnesses and documents necessary to assist in the 
proof of the facts alleged in the petition as stated above. 
4. Issue an order for post conviction relief to have the petitioner 
brought before it, to the end that he may be discharged from the 
illegal and unconstitutional confinement and restraint. 
Dated this <&* day of Afi*>/ 1992. 
le C. Hendricks Ly
Attorney Pro-Se 
A 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the forgoing Petition for 
Writ of Error Coram Nobis and Post Conviction relief to Judge David E. Roth Second 
District Court, 2549 Washington Blvd. Ogden, Utah, 84401 to the office of the court 
clerk, Municipal Building, Ogden, Utah, 84401. And Reed M. Richards, Weber 
County Attorney 7lh floor Municipal Bldg. Ogden, Utah, 84401. 
This 3A^_day of fl^ll 1992. 
Lyle^C. Hendricks 
Attorney Pro-Se 
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A D D E N D U M I 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEJER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH ^° 
LYLE C. HENDRICKS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
rr.oo 
RULINlf ON PETITION ?©R 
WRIT Of ERROR CORAM ^ 
NOBIS3N TRIAL COUR^ 
CO 
Case No. 
en 
671^ 918592 -
MAY t 5 1W2 
Having examined the filed in the above entitled case, I 
find that defendant's petition is repetitious of motions 
previously made and denied and I therefore am dismissing the 
petition* 
DATED this /£ day of May, 1992. 
Ruling on Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis in Trial Court 
Case No. 87198592 
Page 2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the /s day of Mayf 1992, I 
sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on 
Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis in Trial Court to counsel 
as follows: 
Lyle C. Hendricks 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Reed M. Richards 
7th Floor Municipal Bldg 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
puty Court Clerk 
A D D E N D U M J 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT .COURT^OF WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE W liTA'fl 10 o5 
Lyle C. Hendricks 
Petitioner, 
-v-
State Of Utah, 
Respondent 
WRIT OF 
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
DEC 0 \ \9» 
case ito&pj 7 nos-7. v 
MICHAEL D. LYOM 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this matter is invoked upon this court pursuant to the Utah and 
the United States Constitutions. This matter is being filed under Rule 65 B Ut. R. C. P. 
1 and 2. Petitioners claim is timely under Rule 65 in that he has been provided with 
new evidence. Petitioner's confinement is a result of substantial denial of his rights at 
trial. 
FACTS 
1. Petitioner is currently confined at the Utah State Prison. This commitment was a 
result of a jury trial where petitioner was found guilty of Aggravated Robbery. 
Petitioner was sentenced in the District Court of Weber County on February 22, 1988 
to a term of 5 years to life. 
2. Petitioner claims his constitutional rights have been violated in this trial. The 
oot 
record of the trial contains perjured testimony. This testimony and the prosecutions 
referral to it during closing argument establish "intent" of the crime. Without this 
perjured testimony petitioner would not have been found guilty of aggravated robbery. 
3. Petitioner also claims his rights were violated in that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel during his trial. Petitioners attorney refused to believe the 
testimony of Det. Minor during trial was perjured. Petitioners attorney simply allowed 
the testimony into the record unchallenged. 
4. Petitioner has appealed this conviction. These appeals have been denied. 
The claims raised in this petition have not been appealed as they are based on newly 
discovered evidence. This evidence was not available to petitioner at the time of trial 
or during Filing of post conviction relief. 
STATEMENT OF T H E ISSUES 
1 . Petitioner was found guilty of the offence of aggravated robbery. This trial by 
jury establish petitioners presence during this alleged robbery. The evidence 
however does not establish intent to commit aggravated robbery. The evidence does 
show in fact nothing was taken during the robbery. Even that trial court agreed there 
may be a question as to intent and agreed to allow jury instructions to include lesser 
included offenses of attempted robbery. The prosecutor in his closing argument told 
the jury they could find both the elements of the robbery and the intent to commit the 
robbery in the testimony of Detective Minor. 
2. Detective Minor testified that petitioner confessed to him about the crime. Mr. 
Minor said in his confession petitioner stated he needed to do the robbery to get drugs 
2 
• 002 
so he could go through with a killing. Mr. Minor testified this confession took place 
with petitioners attorney, G. Scott Jensen present. 
3. During the testimony of Detective Minor petitioner objected. A conference was 
held in judges chambers and petitioners trial counsel was told to contact Mr. Jensen. 
At this point the court recognized if Det. Minor's testimony about the confession were 
untrue the jury had been tainted and a mistrial would be in order. To now claim that 
Det. Minor's testimony was not a major part of the juries verdict is an abuse of 
discretion. 
4. Petitioner's trial attorney did not attempt to contact Mr. Jensen as the court 
instructed. It is only through petitioners own efforts that he has obtained an affidavit 
from Mr. Jensen. Petitioner's trial attorney was not acting in his best interest during 
trial. His indifference allowed his perjured testimony to enter into the record and this 
testimony played a major part in the juries verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner's rights were substantially denied in this case. Perjured testimony is 
and abuse of the system. To allow this testimony to go before a jury and play a major 
part in their verdict is a constitutional violation of due process. This issue has not 
been properly addressed and petitioner has a right to a hearing on this matter. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Wherefor petitioner prays this court; 
1. Order petitioner be allowed to proceed in this matter without payment of costs. 
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2. Assume jurisdiction over this matter. 
3. Order briefing be done on this petition pursuant to rule 65-B U.R.C.P. 
4. Set a hearing for oral arguments. 
5. Order petitioners conviction be reversed. 
C •Qh<A/sXi4*h> U^ 
Ly\e(p. Hendricks 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
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RULING ON WRIT OF 
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
Case No. 920900575 
J'V t 3 1993 
Having examined the file in the above entitled case, I 
find that defendant's petition is repetitious of motions 
previously made and denied and I therefore am dismissing the 
petition on the ground that is frivolous. 
DATED this /3* day of January, 1993. 
MICHAEL J..£LASMANN, Judge 
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OF APPEAL 
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Case No: 920900575 
Petitioner hereby notifies this court of his intention to appeal the judgement 
entered in this matter by the Honorable Michael J. Glassmann, on January 12,1993. 
Petitioner believes he is entitled to the relief sought in the writ and will file for such in 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Respectfully Submitted 
Lyle^C. Hendricks, Petitioner 
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